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Klann: Brief Studies

I
JASPERS' PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

(Bdilo,,s Nole: This brief study is an extended
book review essay prepared by Richard Klann,
associate professor of systematic theology at Concordia Seminary, St. Louis. The book discussed
is Philosophi&a/, P11i1h tmd. Re11e/111ion, by Karl
Jaspers, trans. B. B. Ashton [New York: Harper
& Row, 1967), 368 pages, doth, $15.00.)

This is undoubtedly one of the impressive

books in the area of philosophy of religion
published in this decade. It was originally
issued in 1962 by Pieper in Munich under
the tide Der ,philosophische Glaube angesichls der O.ienbar1'ng. As one of the existentialist opponents of Heidegger, Jaspers
has had a remarkably pervasive influence on
philosophers and theologians who wish to
retain the importance and meaning of "uanscendence" along with their humanistic program.

BRIEF STUDIES

istence can be apprehended only if the same
process includes the force of the transcendent.
Since transcendence also cannot be grasped
or possessed by discursive knowledge, the
task of philosophy becomes "preliminary
play," that is, the exercise of conveying as
"ciphers of transcendence" the metaphysical
teachings transmitted by history. This effort
is intended to provide the necessary conditions for the existential apprehension of historic teachings by means of personal experience. In his analysis of the history of philosophy, Jaspers asserted that the development and exposition of the dominant ideas
of Western thought must necessarily include
the thoughts and concerns of Eastern and
Asian thinkers, both for historical and substantive reasons, and because Asian thinkers
also display an awareness of the "ciphers of
transcendence."
Jaspers believes that
fewer and fewer people can satisfy their inmost needs in present forms of ecclesiastically
authorized faith in. biblical revelation. These
forms will not unite the globe, not even the
Wesr. For almost tw0 thousand years the
Christian, ecclesiastically fashioned faith in
revelation has failed to realize the ethos of
truth in the ways of life and of thinkina, in.
action and in personalities. so as to make it
convincing for all. • • • Only in freedom
can men come to be of one mind. Today we
seek the ground on which men of every
religious persuasion might meaningfully meet
around the world, ready to recommit themselves to their own historic traditions, to
purify them, to transform them, but not to
abandon them. The only common ground
for the diversity of faiths would be dear
thinking, truthfulness, and a common basic
knowledge. These are the premises of that
limitless communication in which the serious
origins of faith aruaa each other. (P. :av)

Trained in psychiatry and psychology,
Jaspers moved to the study of philosophy
and became professor in Heidelberg from
1921 to 1938, when the Nazis forced him
out of his chair. After the German collapse
of 1945, he conuibuted to the restoration
of the university until he transferred to Basel
in 1948.
The development of his philosophical investigation moved toward a transcendent existentialism
(Ps1chologie der Wel1anscha1111ng, 1921; 4th ed., 1954). The core
assertion of his philosophy (in Philoso,phitJ,
Vol II, "Existenzerhellung") holds that the
ultimate or the most interior reality of man's
existence cannot be grasped by means of an
objectifying discursive knowledge but must
be aroused by a challenging appeal to man.
For this reason he also rejected Heidegger's
existentialistic ontology as well as the claims
of philosophical anthropologies for their unAccordingly, Jaspers rejects "enlightened
reliable rigidities. This judgment logically
followed from Jaspers' conviction that ex- rationalism" because "it furnishes the means
221
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of sophistical delusion which keeps the world
in its fraudulent state." Nor does the "unanimous knowledge" of science yield a common ground of life. Jaspers proposes to
speak from the source of philosophical faith.
He wants to show that "loss of faith in revelation does not exclude a constant recommitmeot to the Bible's irreplaceable truth."
How does Jaspers propose to achieve his
purpose? He begins with man's realization
of being in ibis world and in no other. The
ancient philosophical insight "definitely clarified by Kant" is his starting point: ''The eye
in the world, the light that we are and see
by, signifies to us the way of being." This
immanentism is the "phenomenality of existence."
Jaspers writes: "I do not believe in revelation; to my knowledge I have never believed
in the possibility." Those who asserted that
they had received a revelation and spoke accordingly ( "Moses, the prophets of doom and
salvation, and Jesus- and . . . Buddha"),
ripped open the human situation, "not so as
to bare a knowable, explorable cause, but as
the experience of an inconceivable reality
that appears to man and uses him as its
voice." (P. 8)
Many superficial reasons have been given
for believing revelations. But "the crux is
that we cannot be indifferent to revelations
which men proclaim they had, or to
men in whom others believe as revelations,
if the weight of what is believed to have
been revealed makes it a matter of inescapable existential import to this day. The faith
in .revelation has broUBht forth contents,
impulses, works, deeds, which are now true
and humanly accessible without it." (Ibid.)
The church administered .revelation and
claimed to be its authoritative interpreter
on the grounds that innumerable many.rs
had witnessed to it.
Buddhism has no martyrs, Budc:lhists suffered
persecution in China without raising up mililallt martyn qainst their environment. Islam
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was a warrior religion, conquering and dominating from the outset; martyrdom is alien
to it. But the Church saw itself both as the
Church Militant, witnessed by its martyrs,
and the Church Triumphant, which made
martyrs. The measure of its pride is symbolically evident in the famous statues of
Church and Synagogue on the cathedral of
Strasbourg: in the figure of the Church, the
radiant arrogance of the supposedly knowing
who see God Himself in Christ; in the Synagogue, the human destiny of failure in the
"blindness" of not knowing, of never seeing
the invisible God. . . . To enforce its authority, the Church had a unique weapon even
before it came to temporal power. The weapon was exclusion from its community.
(P. 35)
By way of explanation, it may be helpful
to remember the enormous impact of the
Enlightenment on German thought. One of
the influential features was the importation
and study of Far Eastern sacred texts and
concepts. Hermann Samuel Reimarus ( 1694
to 1768 ) , professor of Oriental languages
in Hamburg, argued against the "particularity" of the Gospel to the point of denying
its credibility. Hegel, although he confessed
himself in a letter to be a genuine Lutheran,
announced in his lecture on the "Philosophy
of History" that no one has a right to claim
to understand the meaning of history without a thorough knowledge of Far Eastern .religions. Such attitudes exhibit the consequences of the resumption of the contacts
with the Far East, beginning with the activities of the British East India Company in the
17th century, which had been interrupted by
the Moslem conquest and control of the
traffic routes to the Far East.
'Ihe total impaa of the Enlightenment on
the Christian theology of the West has
worked to dissolve the particularistic claim
of the Gospel in favor of a "universalistic"
understanding of truth ( "there a.re many
.routes to God and His heaven"). Accordingly, the modern view of philosophers of
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religion is often "tripartite," including science, philosophy, theology.
Jaspers, however, insists on the "break"
of science and philosophy with theological
cognition. "Science has nothing to do with
faith in revelation" ( p. 5 5 ) . But the break
is of a different sort for philosophy. In its
own way it has a great deal to do with faith
in revelation. Here we meet a key idea in
Jaspers• thought: the philosophy of the
modes of encompassing- "We have a word
for that which, split into subject and object,
becomes appearance. We call it 'encompassing"' (p. 61 ). "The encompassing of
Being itself - encompassed by the encompassing that we are - is called world and
Transcendence" (p. 69). He means that
"consciousness at large," existence, the mind,
and Existenz according to his interpretation
lead to reflection. "I am a thinking person.
I have imagination." These considerations
point to or exhibit a "world of the mind
both discovered and produced by me"
(p. 69). This means for Jaspers that "we
live always in a basic knowledge that may
be more or less clear. In great historic communities it is present at every step, from
vague feelings to images and on to a systematic unfoldment in philosophy." (P. 86)
This kind of thinking, Jaspers asserts, is
done by means of "ciphers."
When we say "ciphers," we expressly do not

mean to refer to things, matters, facts, realities, although it seems that the cipher contents have mostly been viewed as real entities, like physical realities in space and time.
People have lived under their pressure as
under the pressure of physical threats. It
was as such that they conquered nations and
ages. The great step in which man transforms himself occurs when the supposed corporeality of Transcendence is given up as
deceptive and the ambiguous cipher language
is heard instead - when the contents that
have been conceived and visualized are
stripped of objective reality. Instead of ungibles there remain ciphers open to infinitely
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varied interpretation. . . . Ciphers may uplift us existentially or express Godless defiance or induce a Luciferian plunge into nonentity. Man lives in ciphers from the day he
starts to think, but not until discrimination
brightens his world and his knowledge does
he feel called upon to purify this realm of
language. Now he seeks truth and veracity.
He wants to draw a stria line between reality
and ciphers, and the basic perversion seems
to be that of transforming the suspended
cipher language into embodied reality. Ciphers are never the reality of Transcendence
itself, only iu possible language. (Pp. 92
to 93)
By means of such instruments of understanding (modes of encompassment, ciphers), Jaspers offers his analysis of major
topics of theology and history until he arrives at the point of "breaking through ontology" (p. 200). This achievement of rational being he calls "periechontology," a
basic knowledge that is not a cipher. Mindful of Jaspers' immanentism, the alert reader
may rightly wonder whether or not this is
a secularizing pillage of the classical theological concept of "perichoresis."
The ciphers of the existential situation,
which is Jaspers' designation for his analysis
of physical and moral evil, leads him to the
topic concerning the knowledge of God and
to the question, What is man? His book
concludes with his analysis and recommendations regarding "a change in Biblical religion."
Jaspers' use of "cipher" appears to be his
designation for the shadowy images of Plato"s
cave, retailed in modern mythological form.
This would account for his stress on the
universality of accessible knowledge by which
man "transforms himself." But the way to
this goal of self-transformation is the use
of the cipher-myths ( which I am tempted
to call the ideology of self-understanding)
as challenging images for self-reflection for
the purpose of obuining "clarity about the
source and the point of our life." (P. 312)
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Jaspers' thought cannot be classified as
&0ing beyond essentially humanistic assertions, despite his willingness to make room
for "transcendence." The particularistic
claims of the Christian church, reinforced by
the refusal of Christian orthodoxy to maintain fellowship where these claims are denied, loom before him as the chief offence
against the integrity of existentialist man in
his aspirations toward freedom. In this offence converges historic Christianity's rejection of the claim of autonomous man, including the claims advanced by Jaspers.
Our general evaluation of Jaspers' thought
cannot make room for a consideration of his
analysis of topics of Christian doctrine in
terms of his aiteria, because Christians necessarily reject them in their "obedience to the
Gospel." Jaspers himself recognizes this fact
with some aversion in his quotation from
Bultmann:
To one who believes in revelation, a philosophical faith cannot be faith in God. I quote
from one of the most tolerant theologians:
"It is indeed only either here or there that
God is rightly understood, and from the
standpoint of Christian belief a humanistic
deism must be called an error and delusion in so far as it is meant to be faith in God"
( Bultmann, S1.Ji11m. g1nn11l1, Vol. 1) • This
example-without a trace of the arrogance
we find now and then in theologians - may
serve to show that it lies in the nature of the
faith in revelation to make even such a man
think in this fashion. (P. 324)
The topic of the authority and interpretation of the Bible illustrates for us Jaspers'
understanding of the offence of historic
Christianity. He writes:
The authority lies not in the word but in
the "spirit'' which in the Bible speaks only to
kindred spirits. It is interpretative adoption,
not leamed knowledge or any kind of insight
that awakens us to the present ieality of original faith.
There is a distinction in the interpretation
and adoption of the Bible. Theology knows
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"scriptural evidence," philosophy does not.
Both of them interpret, but in philosophical
interpretation the Bible is not, as a matter of
principle, superior to other texts.
In practice, one who acknowledges "scriptural evidence" reserves the right of correct
interpretation to himself, whether on his own
authority, like Luther, or by the catholic authority of a church. Other interpretations are
deemed false. But experience teaches us that
there is no end to such theological disputes;
the real issue is who is empowered to make
the correct interpretation. The self-certainty
of a reformer claiming this authority disturbs
his environment - provided it will listen while the silent power of ecclesiastical authority brings peace. To follow the combat
method of scriptural evidence is as irksome
to clear-eyed believers in revelation as to
people who philosophize, for this battleground shows what lies hidden in such dogmatically "proving" kind of faith: the persecution of heretics, Luther's "firm statements," a barren striving for religious knowledge, and specious attempts to reconcile the
contradictions in the Bible.•••
One who rejects scriptural evidence - because a procedure that will let you prove
everything proves actually nothing, and because in the area of faith any "proof" is
absurd- acknowledges for himself what he
can make his own. He will grant the reality
of another man's faith and will never make
statements of absolute self-assurance. To him,
essential decision lies in the choices of life,
in the continuity of Exislenz in phenomenal
existence, not in acts of confession and tenets
of a creed. In the Bible he finds the ground
of both such freedom and such earnestness.
Authority does not lie in the word, not in
the text, not in the Bible, but in the encompassing that is at once subjective and objective
in original adoption, in free association with
the Bible.
Can we hear revelation? We can always
hear its substance in human language - but
that is not revelation.
Revelation has to be distinguished from the
faith in it. If the revelation were real, it
would be unconditional: if God himself
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speaks, there is no authority that might impose conditions on his word. Nothing would
remain but obedience. But the faith in revelation is a human reality and subject to conditions. (Pp. 335-336)
Major points of these quotations may be
summarized as follows:
1. The problem of authority must be considered in relation to the nature of the Bible
as a collection of religious literature representative of the religious experiences of the
authors and the encompassing, autonomous
"spirit.. of the interpreting reader. For the
existentialist, according to Jaspers, there is
no Biblical authority nor Biblical truth apart
from the autonomous interpreter. The existentialistic interpreter recognizes no objective
authority; only subjectively apprehended effects have authority. The Bible, therefore,
is not, and it does not report or exhibit,
revelation objectively; rather, it boco,n,es a
word of God if and when the existentialist
believes it. Believing it makes any word a
word of God, regardless of where the existentialist finds it.
2. Since the interpretive reader following
the autonomous activity of his own "spirit"
cannot and will not make "firm statements"
in the manner of Luther's asserliones, therefore neither "scriptural evidence" nor "dogmatic proofs of faith" exist, except as "specious attempts to reconcile the contradictions
in the Bible." This kind of logic entails for
the Christian interpreter who follows the
existentialist program a consistent refusal to
assert any Christian article of faith except
as a personal or subjective and instantly revisable opinion. He cannot even assert his
witness to another Christian on the basis of
"scriptural evidence," since no "dogmatic
proofs of faith" exist for the existentialist.
For example, the witness of the apostles, that
they have seen the risen Lord, has no objective validity or authority for the existentialist whose first loyalty belongs to the au-
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tonomous activity of his own spuJt. However the point is verbalized, the transcendence
which the existentialist seeks is always limited by his own powers of religious sensitivity, by the strength and the number of
rungs in the ladder of his religious imagination. It is a version of the Icarian flight to
the sun.
3. Revelation is therefore not an objective
reality for the existentialist: "If the revelation were real, it would be unconditional;
if God speaks, there is no authority that
might impose conditions on his word. Nothing would remain but obedience." Ethical
freedom is the primal phenomenon for the
existentialist. In the exercise of such a freedom he believes he tears himself free from
the danger of understanding himself as a
mere transitional link in the chain of causal
necessity. In his Dasei,1 the human person
must stand in relationship to himself: the
autonomous activity of his spirit requires
this minimally. But if God really does reveal
Himself, then even the existentialist must
concede that "nothing would remain but
obedience": that would destroy man in his
Dasein, that is, in his autonomous understanding of himself and consequent self•
relatedness. Therefore, the apostolic demand
that Christians be obedient to the faith is
not to be interpreted as a revelation of God's
will; it is merely kerygmatic counsel whose
potential may be realized only when the
hearer is grasped by it.
It may be useful here to refer to Hegel's
famous preface to his Philosophy of Righi
where he wrote: "What is rational is actual,
and what is actual is rational." Remembering that Hegel clearly distinguished between
Wirklichkeil (reality) and mere DtUein
(existence), the quotation should not be
understood as his unreserved approval of
whatever powers there be. But the Young
Hegelians constrUed this statement as a basically activist postulate which called for the
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recoDSttUction of reality in terms of rational
principles. The existentialist is never far
from the Hegelian kingdom envisioned by
modern activists. He does not downgrade
rationality: that would diminish man in his
D1111in. He maintains that the rational becomes the actual when man realizes his ethial freedom as the primal phenomenon in
the understanding of his self-relatedness. In
this light of existentialistic understanding
the autonomous spirit of man must deny
the obligation to obey the revelation of God.
He must do that, because there is no unconditional revelation. The failure of the
existentialist arises from his concenuation on
the ordinariness of the means of revelation
and from his high estimate of the apprehending religious sensitivities of autonomous
man. Logically extended, we deal with a
solipsism: that the self is the only existent
thing which knows and can know nothing
but its own modifications and states.
4. Since revelation itself cannot be heard
( except "its substance in human language
- but that is not revelation"), therefore "to
receive tenets of the biblical faith into the
philosophical experience of Transcendence,
we must divest them of the form of revelation" - a task accomplished with much success by the use of the historical-critical
method of interpretation, although not always to Jaspers' satisfaction. Thus divested,
man is open to the tenets of the Biblical
faith and hears "in the sense of listening
with all that one has in one -- but it need
not be the hearing that means to hear God
reveal himself . . • we cannot admit in true
openness that the revelation must be heard
a revelation." (All quotations cited in the
above four points are taken from pp. 336 to
337.) The point made here by Jaspers is
not new. He says, for example, that the
Bible may contain the substance of revelation
in human language (which accounts for the
many theologies in the Bible), but the
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Christian Scriptures are unconditionally not
revelation. If they contain the substance of
revelation, even this residue cannot assume
reality and authority until the autonomous
spirit of man is willing to give it commensurate recognition according to his capacities for his self-relatedness. Jaspers' argument turns out to be a remarkably weak
philosophical support for those historicalcritical interpreters of the Bible who "save"
the meaning of the religious utterance of the
texts or terms only by denying to them the
cognitive function Christians have claimed
for them. Their objectives are clear enough,
but hardly edifying or praiseworthy. Astonishing is the tenacity of the "spirit of autonomous man" dominant in these interpreters
as well as the ideological receptivity of their
readers or hearers.
"Unless there can be communication between the two origins of faith, theology and
philosophy will remain separate and mutually exclusive," Jaspers writes (p. 356).
How can this communication be brought
about, according to Jaspers? "For the controversy between theology and philosophy to
disappear, the things proclaimed in the
church would have to shed their character
of revealed realities, dogmas, and creeds in other words, their proclamation would
have to become a conjuration of ciphers.
Today such a metamorphosis appears utopian
in aii churches, and perhaps it would indeed
cancel what no church can be without: the
historic authority itself as an element of
faith." (P. 357)
Jaspers sees "obedience to the faith" as
submission to the totalitarian authority of
rulers who "themselves are always human,
members of the very species that is supposed
to need slavery because it cannot be free"
(p. 358). The recognition and acknowledgment of authority entails man's enslavement,
Jaspers argues, and he cites the Constantinian
victory of the ancient church as an illustra-
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tion of such objectionable spiritual-political
bondage. Hope, "the deceptive gift from
Pandora's box," is the only option by which
men can "live and die and work" (p. 359).
"There does remain a very different distinction between faith in revelation and philosophical faith, and that lies in their ways of
hope. Hope on the ground of revealed promises, for instance, or of the reality of Christ
as revealed in the Resurrection, differs radically from hope on the ground of the truth
shown by philosophical reason." (P. 360)
"Is mutual rejection an inherent necessity" for theology and philosophy? Jaspers
answers affirmatively, but he believes that
the self-doubt of both Christian believers
and philosophical believers may turn their
feelings of certainty into feelings of deficiency (p. 361 ). "The conquest of their
doubts is what makes both sides recognize
each other's faith, if they are honest." (P.
362)
Jaspers' conclusion is therefore similar to
Tallyrand's advice to a young friend: "No
zeal, please." Vinson, the late Chief Justice
of the United States, said it more bluntly in
a written majority opinion of the Supreme
Court: ''There are no absolutes." This is the
prudence of the autonomous and pragmatic
man determined to minimize the risks of
living, loving, and believing, and to maximize their coveted benefits. He is the sensible man who insists monistically on the
seigniory or lordship of his judgment of the
sensible data. Ultimately he must defend the
solipsist position that only knowledge of the
self is possible, so that for each individual
the data of which he is aware are the only
existent reality.
Probably no one can quarrel with Jaspers'
concern when he writes: "The basic phenomenon is that the Church, a group of men,
turns the call upon God into an instrument
of worldly power" (p. 44). What he sees
as "the basic phenomenon," however, is only
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the basic phenomenon of the perversion of
the mission of the church. When he writes
that "authority requires means of compulsion" (p. 45), so that we are led to conclude that all authority f/114 authority is
demonic, inasmuch as the autonomous freedom of man in his existence is displaced, he
has not yet offered us insights beyond the
complaints of libertarian humanism. His
basic position is not really mitigated by this
paragraph:
Now that they no longer have a "secular
arm," the churches firmly reject the methods
once developed by their own totalitarianism
and now far more cunningly used in behalf
of total rule. Yet even now the ecclesiastic
faith, with charaaeristic totalitarian naivete,
regards itself as the sole, authorized infallible
vessel of truth and inwardly denies the equal
rights of the "heathen," the infidel, the
heretic. (P. 47)

Excommunication is for Jaspers a reprehensible aspect of the particularity of the
Gospel which "denies the equal rights" in
the Christian church of those who will not
believe the Gospel. His concern for the
equal rights of unbelievers in the Christian
church is the product of his affirmation of
the autonomous spirit of man, his denial of
revelation, authority, obedience. He does not
explain how the Christian church can possibly grant, or even acknowledge, equal
rights in the Christian church for those who
openly deny and work against the very articles of faith which make the Christian church
uniquely what it is. Nor would the charitable
willingness either of individual Christians or
of Christian churches to grant such equal
rights to the autonomous spirit of existentialists be at all helpful. Equal rights in the
Christian church are the gift of the Head of
the church available to those who make no
autonomous claims.
Jaspers' polemical remarks about excommunication, beyond some conventional judgments of the medieval church, reveal his
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failure to apprehend the Biblical meaning
of membership in the Christian church. Luther did not invent a private interpretation
when he asserted in his Treatise Co,ice-m ing
the Ban of 1520 that unbelief in the Gospel
concerning Jesus Christ alone separates a
person from the church of Christ, never the
merely formal ban of the ecclesiastical instit11tion. In its proper sense, excommunication
is a public recognition of a broken relationship- like divorce. It is a protective decision of the Christian church against the sowing of doctrinal wild oats within the household of God. After all, every denial of the
unique claims of the Gospel, or of the Christian articles of faith, in imitation of the
style of Ishmael, must in principle lead to
the abolition of the Gospel.
This is such a well-known fact that one
remains in the grip of perpetual astonishment at the liberality of the humanism of
those who object to this position on any
grounds whatever. Applied to those within
the church, the incident of Abraham-SarahHagar-Ishmael would appear to suggest that
the bearers of the promise may indeed use
philosophical-humanistic ideas or concepts as
''Egyptian servants," but the begetting of
paralegitimate offspring through them is
bound to have undesirable consequences for
both parents and offspring in their relation
to the promise of the covenant. Jaspers has
indeed reached for the jugular of the Christian faith when he denies the authenticity
of its particularity as well as the Christian
church's right to defend it by the excommunication of those who will maintain their
perdurable rejection of it.
Jaspers has well understood that the particularity of the Gospel, its historical uniqueness, and its total claim on man is the encompassing offence of historic Christianity.
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The Gospel simply has no room for the
claims of autonomous man, including the
claims advanced by Jaspers. Since the Christian church is the community of those who
accept, believe, trust, and hope in Jesus
Christ, whose Gospel is the new covenant, it
is impossible to assimilate this Gospel to
another gospel which is grounded in philosophical existentialism.
To summarize: The core assertion of Jaspers' philosophy directs its impact against
the historic Christian doctrine of revelation
which the Scriptures both record and exhibit.
Furthermore, when Jaspers maintains that
the ultimate and most interior reality of
man's existence cannot be grasped by means
of an objectifying discursive knowledge, but
must be aroused by a challenging appeal to
man, he is correct if we translate his statement to mean that the Gospel cannot be
effectively preached or taught by mechanical
transmission on the order of a Tibetan
prayer wheel. But he is quite wrong on this
point if his thesis implies a denial of the
objective content and form of the Scriptures
as revelation, as well as their instrumental
effectiveness by the operation of the Holy
Spirit on the person of the believer, without
any kind of contributory participation of
man to effect his conversion.
The publication of this fine uanslation of
Jaspers' opus unquestionably is a great service to the American reader. He will be
able to inform himself directly that Jaspers'
challenge to the faith of the Christian church
is at least as great and encompassing as that
which Erasmus hurled at Luther in 1524.
Jaspers' argument, if taken seriously, will
compel theologians either to gather about
the Gospel or to abandon the form and content of the Bible as revelation altogether.
RICHARD KLANN
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